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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS-PUBLIC EMPLOYEES MAY SPEAK 
A LITTLE EVIlr-Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis­
trict, 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first amendment to the Constitution! prohibits govern­
ment2 from abridging citizens' freedom of speech. The simplicity of 
this concept belies the difficulty' that courts have had in inter­
preting it to guarantee fundamental first amendment rights to citi­
zens who have become state employees. Traditionally, states could 
legitimately condition public employment on the relinquishment of 
first amendment rights by requiring loyalty oaths3 and other guar­
antees of nonsubversive activity by their employees. More recently, 
however, public employees' first amendment rights have begun to· 
receive protection4 through a balancing of the interest of the state, 
as employer, against the interest of the employee, as citizen, in 
commenting on matters of public concern. 5 In conformity with the 
progressive expansion of first amendment protection afforded pub­
lic employees, the United States Supreme Court in Givhan v. 
Western Line Consolidated School District6 held that first amend­
ment protection extends to the private communications between a 
public employee and her employer.7 This holding significantly ex­
pands the scope of first amendment protection previously afforded 
public employees. Its subsequent treatment by the courts has ex­
panded the contours of the first amendment for private citizens as 
well. 8 
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro­
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the govern­
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. The first amendment applies to the federal government by its expess terms, 
and to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
3. Gamer v. Board of Pub. Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); cf. Bai­
ley v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afI'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See gener­
ally R. S. BROWN, LOYALTY & SECURITY 92-118 (1958); Morris, Academic Freedom 
and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 487 (1963). 
4. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text. 
5. See notes 53-61 infra and accompanying text. 
6. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
7. [d. at 415-16. 
8. Se"e notes 128-37 infra and accompanying text. 
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II. FACTS 
In 1970, plaintiff Bessie Givhan, a nontenured,9 black school 
teacher, was transferred to the previously all-white Glen Allan School 
in accordance with the tenns ofa court-ordered desegregation decree 
enunciated in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dis­
trict. 10 At the Glen Allan School, friction developed between Mrs. 
Givhan and the principal, James Leach, over what she tenned "re­
quests"ll for changes in practices she perceived to be racially dis­
criminatory.12 As a result of this conflict Principal Leach recom­
mended that Mrs. Givhan not be rehired at the end of the 1970 
school year, and in fact she was not rehired. 13 
Mrs. Givhan alleged that her dismissal was in violation of the 
desegregation provisions of Singleton, which require that "objec­
tive and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards"14 be used in se­
lecting staff members for dismissal or demotion. She then filed a 
class action15 suit against the school district seeking reinstate­
ment. 16 The court denied the class action suit17 and dismissed the 
complaint. IS Mrs. Givhan, however, was granted the right to inter­
vene in Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 19 
which addressed the school district's compliance with Singleton. 
Mrs. Givhan subsequently intervened and sought reinstate­
9. Mississippi public school teachers have been prohibited by statute from be­
ing tenured from the time this case arose until the present. MISS. CODE ANN. § 
37-9-17 (1972). The school can dismiss any teacher for any reason which does not in­
fringe a constitutional right Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 
1309, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. at 410. Because of plaintiff's untenured 
status she lacked an interest in continued employment. Id. This precluded plaintiff 
from claiming a procedural due process violation, and none was asserted. Id. 
10. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Carter v. West 
Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1969), on remand, 425 F.2d 1211 (5th 
Cir. 1970). 
11. 555 F.2d at 1313. See also notes 22-24 infra and accompanying text. 
12. 439 U.S. at 413. 
13. Id.at411. 
14. Singleton required that "objective and reasonable non-discriminatory 
standards" be used in selecting staff members for dismissal or demotion. 419 F.2d at 
1218. 
15. Suit was commenced in the names of Bessie Givhan, Mary Butler, and 
Dolleye Hodges individually, and for the benefit of three classes of black teachers 
and employees who had been discharged or not rehired by the Board of Education 
of Western Line Consolidated School District. 555 F.2d at 1311. 
16. Givhan v. Board of Educ. W. Line Consol. School Dist., 363 F. Supp. 714 
(N.D. Miss. 1973), rev'd, 555 F.2d at 1309, rev'd, 439 U.S. at 410. 
17. Id.at717. 
18. Id. 
19. 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 439 U.S. at 410. 
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ment on two grounds: First, that nonrenewal of her contract vio­
lated the rule enunciated in Singleton; and second, that it violated 
her first and fourteenth amendment rights of free speech.20 The 
school district defended its action on several grounds. 21 At trial, 
Principal Leach testified to the race and discipline problems ram­
pant in the Glen Allan School and to Mrs. Givhan's announced in­
tention not to cooperate with him. Essentially, however, Principal 
Leach's recommendation not to rehire Mrs. Givhan was based on 
the "demands" she had made on him throughout the school year. 22 
Principal Leach maintained that Mrs. Givhan was arrogant, antago­
nistic, and hostile, particularly with regard to her "unreasonable 
demands. "23 Mrs. Givhan had given him a list of what he termed 
"demands" and what she termed "requests," which all involved 
"Givhan's concern as to the impressions on black students of the 
respective roles of whites and blacks in the school environment. "24 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Mississippi agreed with Mrs. Givhan, holding that nonrenewal of 
her contract violated her first amendment rights. 25 The court found 
that, while Mrs. Givhan had made "demands" on two occasions, 
20. Id. at 1311. 
21. The school district reiterated the reasons the district superintendent had 
given Mrs. Givhan in a letter advising her of her dismissal. The three reasons stated 
in this letter were: 1) Givhan's refusal to administer a nationalized test for her stu­
dents; 2) her intention not to cooperate with the school administrators; and 3) an an­
tagonistic and hostile attitude. Id. at 1312 n.6. Additionally, defendants attempted to 
prove: 
(1) That Givhan "downgraded" the papers of white students; (2) that she 
was one of a number of teachers who walked out of a meeting about 
desegregation in the fall of 1969 and attempted to disrupt it by blowing au­
tomobile horns outside the gymnasium; (3) that the school district had re­
ceived a threat by Givhan and other teachers not to return to work when 
schools reopened on a unitary basis in February, 1970; and (4) that Givhan 
had protected a student during a weapons shakedown at Riverside in March, 
1970 by concealing a student's knife until completion of the search. The evi­
dence on the first three of these points was inconclusive and the district 
judge did not clearly err in rejecting or ignoring it. Givhan admitted the 
fourth incident, but the district judge properly rejected that as a justification 
for her not being rehired, as there was no evidence that Leach relied on it 
in making his recommendation. 
Id. at 1313 n.7. 
22. Mrs. Givhan had given Leach demands seeking placement of blacks in the 
"choice" ticket taking jobs in the cafeteria, better integration of the administrative 
staff, and assignment of the black Neighborhood Youth Corps workers to semi­
clerical tasks rather than solely janitorial positions. Id. at 1313. 
23. Id. at 1314. 
24. Id. at 1313. 
25. 439 U.S. at 412. 
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they had been neither "petty" nor "unreasonable" since they in­
volved what Mrs. Givhan perceived to be racially discriminatory 
practices. 26 In the court's opinion, plaintiff's criticism of the poli­
cies and practices of the school board was the primary reason for 
nonrenewal of her contract. 27 The district court, therefore, ordered 
her reinstated. 
Judge Gewin of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that no constitutional right had 
been implicated in Mrs. Givhan's dismissal. Because Mrs. Givhan 
had communicated privately with her employer, the circuit court 
held the communication to be unprotected. This principle, that 
"private expression by a public employee is not constitutionally 
protected,"28 was asserted to be the "strong implication"29 of Pick­
ering v. Board of Education,30 Perry v. Sindermann,31 and Mt. 
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle. 32 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, 
holding that first amendment freedom is not "lost to the public em­
ployee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer 
rather than to spread his views before the public. "33 Justice 
Rehnquist stated that, although Pickering, Perry, and Doyle each 
focused on protection of a public employee's public expression, this 
fact was merely coincidental,34 and the rule to be derived from 
these cases should not preclude protection of a public employee's 
private expressions. 35 Givhan, therefore, was remanded in light of 
the Supreme Court's expanded view of first amendment expres­
sion. 36 
This casenote will place Givhan in an historical perspective by 
reviewing the gradual development of the law relating to public 
employees' first amendment rights. With this background, the cir­
cuit court opinion can be analyzed in the proper perspective. 
Finally, the Supreme Court's holding and its subsequent applica­
26. [d. at 412-13. 
27. 555 F.2d at 1314. 
28. [d. at 1318. 
29. [d. 
30. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
31. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
32. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
33. 439 U.S. at 415-16. 
34. [d. at 414. 
35. For a detailed discussion of Pickering, Perry, and Doyle, see text accompa­
nying notes 69-73 infra. 
36. 429 U.S. at 417. 
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tion by lower courts will illustrate the significance and current sta­
tus of the Givhan decision. 
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' 

FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 

A. Historical Background 
Historically, public employment was perceived as a privilege 
which could be conditioned upon relinquishment of constitutional 
rights. 37 For example, courts have upheld the validity of statutes 
requiring dismissal of teachers belonging to "subversive organiza­
tions"38 and prohibiting membership in organizations advocating 
overthrow of the government. 39 The basis for this rule has been 
traced to Justice Holmes' statement that a public servant "may 
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu­
tional right to be a policeman. "40 History illustrates that the condi­
tioning of public employment upon the relinquishment of constitu­
tional rights was a direct result of the theory that public 
employment was a privilege, not a right. 41 Since it was considered 
a privilege, the state had the power to impose conditions on public 
employment which it could not impose on the population in gen­
eral. As recently as 1952, the United States Supreme Court, in 
Adler v. Board of Education, 42 reaffirmed this position by holding 
that persons seeking public employment are subject to "the rea­
sonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of [the state] 
...."43 While the right-privilege distinction held sway, states could 
condition public employment on a variety of constitutionally imper­
missible grounds. 44 
37. See Comment, Development in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. 
REV. 1045, 1065 (1968); Comment, First Amendment Rights and Teacher Dismissal: 
A Survey, 4 OHIO N. L. REV. 392, 392 (1977); Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers' 
Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1256, 1256 (1974). 
38. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (court upheld validity of 
statute requiring dismissal of any teacher belonging to "subversive organizations"). 
39. Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). 
40. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,220, 29 N.E. 517,517 
(1892). See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu­
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). 
41. Id. 
42. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
43. Id. at 492. 
44. See generally Adler v. Board of Educ., id. at 485; Fenstermacher's Appeal, 
36 Pa. D.&C. 373 (1939); Van Alstyne, supra note 40. 
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B. 	 The Keyishian Case-Decline of the Right-Privilege Doctrine 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 45 the Supreme Court repu­
diated the right-privilege distinction and specifically rejected the 
basis on which Adler had been decided. 46 The appellants in 
Keyishian were teachers who had been dismissed for refusing to 
sign a certificate denying membership in any organization which 
advocated overthrow of the government. The Supreme Court re­
versed the lower court, holding the statute to be unconstitutional 
because it was vague and overbroad, and ordered the teachers re­
instated. The Court then enunciated a new, greatly expanded rul­
ing to protect teachers. Academic freedom was characterized as a 
"transcendent value" of "special concern" to the first amendment. 47 
In conformity to this new standard the Court expressly rejected the 
premise upon which Adler had been decided, "that public employ­
ment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon 
the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged 
by direct government action. "48 
Unfortunately, what Keyishian gave to the individual in in­
creased constitutional protection, it took from the states by fail­
ing to define explicitly the circumstances under which states 
could limit employees' speech.49 For example, in several deci­
sions the Supreme Court has noted the impact that teachers can 
have on the minds of young people50 and on our democratic way 
45. 	 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
46. Id. at 605-06. The Court again addressed the constitutionality of the 
Feinburg Law, N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 3022 (McKinney 1970), which made membership 
in the Communist Party a prima facie ground for dismissal. The Court held the "con­
stitutional doctrine which has emerged since [Adler1has rejected its major premise." 
385 U.S. at 605. 
47. Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the first amend­
ment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom. 
ld. at 603. 
48. ld. at 605. Among the cases cited by the Court as leading to the result an­
nounced in Keyishian were: Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 
551 (1950). 
49. 	 Van Alstyne, supra note 40, at 1448; Note, supra note 37, at 1260-61. 
50. 	 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960); Adler v. Board of Educ., 
342 U.S. at 485. 
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes atti­
tudes of young minds toward the society in which they live. In this, the 
state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That 
the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen ... teachers ... 
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of life. 51 Commentators also have called attention to the teacher's 
special role as interpreter of school board policy, a role which 
requires the teacher to inculcate in students values consistent with 
parental expectations. 52 Keyishian abandoned these important 
state interests by failing to identify them as factors which the Court 
should weigh in its decisionmaking process. Keyishian shifted rad­
ically from the previous right-privilege analysis but failed to effec­
tively account for the states' interest in the calculus of values to be 
protected. 
C. The Pickering Case-A Balance 
One year after Keyishian, in Pickering v. Board of Educa­
tion,53 the Court addressed more specifically the extent to which 
the state's interest as employer could be weighed against the em­
ployee's interest in exercising his constitutional right of free 
speech. Pickering was the first in a line of important cases54 to bal­
ance the teacher's first amendment rights against the state's own 
legitimate interests. 
In Pickering, a teacher was fired for writing a letter to the edi­
tor of a local newspaper. The letter denounced the school board for 
its handling of past proposals to raise new revenue and for its allo­
cation of funds between the academic and athletic facilities. The 
school board found the letter detrimental to the efficient operation 
and administration of the school and ordered the plaintiff, Marvin 
Pickering, dismissed. 55 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal on the ground that either the letter was not entitled to 
first amendment protection or that Pickering had waived his consti­
tutional right of free speech by accepting public employment. 56 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court, 
ordering Pickering reinstated, and admonished the Illinois Su­
preme Court for allOWing a state agency to infringe a teacher's con-
as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools cannot be doubted. 
[d. at 493. 
51. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 79 (1979). 
52. Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A Search 
for Standards, 8 GA. L. REV. 837, 846 (1974). 
53. 391 U.S. at 563. 
54. The three most important cases are: Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. at 274; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 593; and Pickering v. Board 
of Educ., 391 U.S. at 563. 
55. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. at 566-67. 
56. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 36 Ill. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967), rev'd, 391 
U.S. at 564. 
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stitutional right to comment on matters of public interest in con­
nection with the operation of the public schools. 57 Justice Marshall 
then enunciated the Pickering test, the first aspect of which re­
quires a weighing of the "interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees. "58 This test specifically 
prohibits the imposition of constitutionally impermissible condi­
tions on public employment59 while at the same time recognizes 
the state's need to regulate the speech of its employees in certain 
circumstances. 6o By allowing states to regulate employees' speech 
in certain situations, the Court corrected the major problem re­
sulting from the Keyishian decision. Keyishian had granted exces­
sive protection to employees' speech by prohibiting states from re­
stricting employees' speech even when it would be reasonable to 
do SO.61 The new test struck a reasonable balance between the fun­
damental interests of both the employee and the state. 
This new test's full potential remained unfulfilled, however, 
because the Court failed to create a general standard for future ap­
plication which detailed the weight to be accorded the state's and 
the employee's interests. Instead, it provided only a general indica­
tion of the interests which states can constitutionally assert to de­
feat a teacher's first amendment right. The maintenance of disci­
pline and harmony among superiors and co-workers,62 the proper 
performance of daily duties,63 and freedom from interference in 
the regular operation of the schools64 were recognized as 
compelling state interests. In addition, the public interest in free 
57. To the extent the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to sug­
gest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First 
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on 
the matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public 
schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequiv­
ocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this court. 
Id. at 568. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. See notes 62-65 infra and accompanying text. 
61. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text. 
62. 391 U.S. at 570. The Court, however, does not indicate the level of discord 
it will tolerate between supervisors and co-workers in attempting to enforce employ­
ees' first amendment rights. 
63. Id. at 572-73. 
64. Id. at 573. 
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debate65 on matters of public concern was a factor to be considered 
in some undetermined manner. The Court did not indicate the rel­
ative values to be accorded these factors and left some confusion 
regarding the proper scope of the state's interest. 66 
The second aspect of the Pickering test was a New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan67 standard for employee statements critical of em­
ployers. Such statements, if false, could not constitute grounds for 
dismissal absent proof that the statements had been made with 
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth 
or falsity. While there may have been some confusion about the 
weight to be given the state's interests in the Pickering balancing 
test, application of the New York Times standard to employee criti­
cisms illustrated the Court's insistence on a strong first amendment 
right for public employees as well as for the citizenry at large. 68 
Untruthful criticisms of an employer will have a tremendously neg­
ative impact on the relationship between employers and employ­
ees, yet, under Pickering, the employee is still within the bounds 
of first amendment protection unless he makes the statements with 
knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, their falsity. The Court 
failed to account for this detrimental consequence, and it estab­
lished a right of practically unhindered first amendment expression 
for public employees. 
D. The Perry Decision-Support for Pickering 
Two subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court, Perry v. 
Sindermann69 and Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Edu­
cation v. Doyle,70 helped to extend and clarify the Pickering bal­
ancing test. In Perry, a nontenured college professor was denied 
contract renewal follOWing a series of public disputes with the col­
lege's board of regents. 71 Robert Sindermann challenged his dismissal 
65. ld. 
66. See Note, Teacher's Freedom of Expression Outside the Classroom: An 
Analysis of the Application of Pickering and Tinker, 8 GA. L. REv. 900, 917 (1974). 
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
68. The Court, however, has characterized some forms of speech, such as ob­
scenity, as unprotected. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) 
("obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press"). 
69. 408 U.S. at 593. 
70. 429 U.S. at 274. 
71. These disputes involved Sindermann's testimony before committees of the 
Texas Legislature and a newspaper advertisement over the respondent's name which 
was highly critical of the regents. 408 U.S. at 594-95. 
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and brought two issues before the Supreme Court: First, whether 
lack of tenure defeated his first and fourteenth amendment claims; 
and second, whether the college's failure to provide him with a 
hearing violated his due process right despite his lack of tenure. 
The Supreme Court, affirming the Fifth Circuit, held that lack of 
tenure would not defeat his first and fourteenth amendment claims 
because the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests­
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. "72 Sindermann al­
leged that he had been fired in retaliation for his public criticisms 
of the board of regents' policies. The Court held that a bona fide 
constitutional claim had been raised. Pickering was then cited by 
the Court for the proposition that "a teacher's public criticism of 
his superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally 
protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for termi­
nation of his employment. "73 Within the confines of this first issue, 
Perry reaffirmed the Court's insistence on strong support for public 
employees' first amendment rights. The second issue, however, 
laid the groundwork for the qualitative refinement of the Pickering 
test subsequently adopted in Doyle. 
Sindermann's lack of tenure did not bar his due process claim, 
but it was relevant to the Court's analysis. Previously, in Board of 
Regents v. Roth,74 the Court held that no constitutional right to a 
hearing existed unless, despite a lack of tenure, a "liberty"75 or 
"property"76 interest in continued employment could be shown. 
Sindermann was able to prove that there was a de facto tenure 
program77 at the state college. He therefore had a "property" in­
terest in continued employment and was entitled to a hearing. 
72. Id. at 597. The Court went on to say: 

For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his con­

stitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms 

would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the govern­

ment to produce a result which [it] could not command directly. Such inter­

ference with constitutional rights is impermissible. 

Id. (footnotes omitted). 
73. Id. at 598. 
74. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). This was a companion case to Perry v. Sinder­
mann, 408 U.S. at 593. 
75. A liberty interest guarantees the plaintiff the right to notice and an op­
portunity to be heard. Failure to provide notice and a hearing when due deprives 
the plaintiff of a constitutionally guaranteed right. For a definition of a liberty inter­
est, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. 
76. Id. at 601. 
77. Id. at 600-01. 
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Placing the burden on the employee to prove he had some consti­
tutionally protected interest presaged the Court's later refinements 
of the Pickering balancing test as pronounced in Doyle. 
E. The Doyle DeCiSion-Refining Pickering 
Doyle, a nontenured teacher, communicated to a local radio 
station the substance of a school memorandum setting standards for 
teachers' dress and appearance. The radio station announced the 
dress code as a news item. Subsequently, Doyle was not recom­
mended for rehiring by the school principal and was not offered a 
contract by the school board for the following year. As justification 
for nonrenewal of Doyle's contract, the board cited the radio sta­
tion incident and another occurrence in which Doyle had made an 
obscene gesture at two students. 78 The district court held that 
Doyle's telephone call to the radio station was protected under the 
first and fourteenth amendments. 79 Furthermore, because Doyle's 
speech had impermissibly played a "substantial part" in the board's 
decision not to renew his contract, it ordered Doyle reinstated 
with back pay. 80 
The Supreme Court, applying the Pickering balancing test,81 
accepted the district court's conclusion that Doyle's speech was 
constitutionally protected. It did not, however, accept the district 
court's analysis, which lacked standards for future application. 82 
The Justices were concerned that the lower court's rule would re­
quire reinstatement in cases when the school board's decision not 
to rehire would have been the same regardless of the teacher's first 
amendment expressions.83 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unani­
mous Court, held that a person's first amendment interest is suffi­
ciently vindicated if he is placed in "no worse a position than if he 
had not engaged in the [protected] conduct. "84 The Court sought 
78. 429 U.S. at 282-83. 
79. Id. at 283-85. 
80. Id. at 283. 
81. Id. at 284. 
82. Id. at 283-84. 
83. Id. at 285-86. 
84. Id. Justice Rehnquist went on to say that: 
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment ques­
tion resolved against him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But 
that same candidate ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to 
prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a 
decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the pro­
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to insure that a public employee's exercise of a constitutional right 
was not instrumental in his dismissal. At the same time, the Court 
did not want to improve an employee's position simply because he 
had exercised a constitutional right. The Court's goal, therefore, 
was to devise a test that "protects against the invasion of constitu­
tional rights without commanding undesirable consequences not 
necessary to the assurance of those rights. "85 
The test developed by the Court achieved these goals. In ad­
dition, it advanced the development of the law in the area of pub­
lic employees' first amendment rights while incorporating aspects 
of previously established standards. Under the terms of the Doyle 
test, a public employee first has the burden of showing that his 
speech was constitutionally protected. 86 This portion of the test 
was derived indirectly from Roth87 and Perry88 and, by necessity, 
incorporates the Pickering balancing test. Without first weighing 
the competing interests of employee and state as required by Pick­
ering, it would be impossible to argue that the employee's speech 
was protected. Having proved that his conduct was constitutionally 
protected, the employee must then show that "this conduct was a 
'substantial factor' ... in the ... decision not to rehire him. "89 If 
this burden is met, the onus is on the employer to prove by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence that he would have made the same de­
cision regardless of the employee's conduct. 90 This aspect of the 
test distinguishes an impermissible result, that is, failure to rehire 
solely on the basis of an employee's exercise of his constitutional 
rights, from one caused by alternative factors unrelated to the exer­
cise of constitutional rights. 
tected conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of his 
decision. 
[d. at 285-86. 
85. [d. at 287. 
86. [d. 
87. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571, in which the Court required 
Roth to prove that he had a "liberty" or "property" interest in continued employ­
ment before he could seek reinstatement. 
88. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599, in which the Court held that the 
opportunity for a hearing is predicated upon the employee proving the decision not 
to rehire him deprived him of a "liberty" or "property" interest. 
89. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287 (footnotes omitted). 
This aspect of the test was derived from both the lower court decision and the Su­
preme Court's previous decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976), which held that a constitutional infringement must be a 
"motivating" factor in a state action before it will be constitutionally impermissible. 
[d. at 266. 
90. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287. 
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With this historical perspective, analysis of the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion91 will shed light on the Supreme Court's subsequent rever­
sal92 and will elucidate its significance in relation to Pickering, 
Perry, and Doyle, 
IV. THE GIVHAN CASE 
A. The Circuit Court Opinion 
Judge Gewin of the Fifth Circuit recognized that the decision 
whether to reinstate Mrs. Givhan would be controlled by the re­
cently articulated Doyle standard. 93 Under Doyle, the primary 
question was the constitutional status of Mrs. Givhan's private 
communications.94 If her statements were constitutionally pro­
tected, the burden then would shift to the state to prove that it 
would have fired Mrs. Givhan regardless of her comments. 95 Nor­
mally, the Pickering balancing test would be used to determine 
whether Mrs. Givhan's' statements merited constitutional protec­
tion, but the circuit court first sought to determine an even more 
fundamental question: whether private communications could ever 
be constitutionally protected.96 Since this was a question of first 
impression, 97 the court sought the answer in general first amend­
ment principles and in the three leading cases of Pickering, Perry, 
and Doyle. 
The circuit court read Pickering, Perry, and Doyle narrowly, 
excluding private communications by a public employee from con­
91. See notes 93-108 infra and accompanying text. 
92. See notes 109-27 infra and accompanying text. 
93. Doyle was decided by the Supreme Court while Givhan was being consid­
ered by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
94. The court of appeals accepted the district court's findings of fact. Signifi­
cantly, the district court found that Givhan's dismissal was motivated primarily by 
her "demands." 555 F.2d at 1315. Since the second aspect of the Doyle test had al­
ready been satisfied, the ultimate issue was whether Givhan's conduct was consti­
tutionally protected. 
95. See notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text. 
96. The court stated that before applying the Pickering test it "must determine 
whether on the facts of this case the teacher had a First Amendment interest as a cit­
izen in making complaints to the principal." 555 F.2d at 1316 (emphasis in original). 
97. Prior to Givhan, only the Third Circuit had considered whether private 
communications were constitutionally protected. In Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of 
Pa., 520 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976), the Third Circuit 
essentially held that private communications were not constitutionally protected. It 
should be noted, however, that the Third Circuit applied the Pickering standard and 
the speech was unprotected in part due to its "potentially disruptive impact on the 
functioning of the Department." ld. at 1368. 
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stitutional protection. 98 In each of these three cases, emphasis was 
placed on the public nature of the employee's criticisms. 99 The 
Fifth Circuit .believed that the dichotomy of protection it was es­
tablishing between public and private speech was supported by 
several recent cases. 100 Analysis of several of the cited cases,101 
however, shows continued emphasis on the public nature of the 
protected speech. In essence, the court read the language in these 
cases so narrowly that a negative inference was derived from a vari­
ety of public employment contexts. In other words, because only 
public speech had been protected in the cited cases, the court 
inferred that only public speech would be protected and that pri­
vate speech was therefore beyond the scope of first amendment 
protection. 
As further support for his decision not to protect private com­
munications, Judge Gewin invoked the "captive audience" ration­
ale. 102 Principal Leach was considered to be incapable of avoiding 
Mrs. Givhan's demands, requests, or complaints because they both 
worked in the same building. 103 This proximity made the principal 
a captive audience. Judge Gewin felt Principal Leach's privacy in­
terest aided in defeating Mrs. Givhan's first amendment right, in 
part, because of the high degree of captivity in the workplace. 104 
The court did not want to force principals to become ombudsmen 
for anyone interested in public education. 105 Judge Gewin, there­
fore, held that "neither a teacher nor a citizen has a constitutional 
right to single out a public employee to serve as the audience for 
his or her privately expressed views. "106 
98. 555 F.2d at 1318. 
99. [d. at 1317-18. 
100. See, e.g., City of Madison, Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 
(5th Cir. 1976); Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cen. 
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973). These cases were cited by the court at 555 F.2d at 
1318 n.15. 
101. Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 
429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976); Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th 
Cir. 1975); Lewis v. Spencer, 490 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g 369 F. Supp. 1219 
(S.D. Tex. 1973). 
102. 555 F.2d at 1319. This doctrine limits an individual's first amendment 
right by preventing her from imposing her message on an audience incapable of 
avoiding it. 
103. [d. at n.16. 
104. [d. 
105. [d. at 1319. 
106. [d. 
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Since Mrs. Givhan's constitutional claim was defeated, the 
court reversed and remanded the case for consideration of her Sin­
gleton claimlo7 under which it was asserted that her dismissal was 
not based on objective nondiscriminatory factors. lOS The court did 
not consider application of the Pickering and Doyle standards be­
cause there was no first amendment claim on which to rule. 
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed 
the circuit court, holding that private expression of one's view is 
constitutionally protected. lo9 In a direct rebuke to the circuit 
court, Justice Rehnquist explained that the 
decisions in Pickering, Perry and [Doyle] ... do not support the 
conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against 
government abridgement of freedom of speech if he decides to 
express his views privately rather than publicly. While those 
cases each arose in the context of a public employee's public ex­
pression, the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on 
that largely coincidental fact. 110 
Having held that a public employee's private expressions were 
9onstitutionally protected, Justice Rehnquist sought to explain both 
the error in the circuit court's reasoning and Givhan's relation to the 
analytical framework established by prior case law. Justice Rehnquist 
briefly synopsized Pickering and the balancing test it established: 
"the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting on 
matters of public concern," are weighed against "the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser­
vices it performs through its employees. "111 He then suggested that 
the Fifth Circuit decision not to protect private communications 
might have been based on the destructive impact Mrs. Givhan's 
comments had on her working relationship with her superior.112 
107. [d. at 1320. 
108. See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text. 
109. 439 U.S. at 413. 

llO. [d. at 414. 

llI. [d. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. at 568). 

112. [d. at 414-15. "Here the opinion of the Court of Appeals may be read to 
tum in part on its view that the working relationship between the principal and 
teacher is significantly different from the relationship between the parties in Picker­
ing . ..." [d. Recall that one of the factors to be weighed in the Pickering test is the 
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Justice Rehnquist's subsequent language,113 however, indicates that 
if the circuit court had held private communications by a public 
employee to be constitutionally protected and then had applied the 
Pickering standard, Mrs. Givhan's conduct still would have de­
feated the school's interest. 114 In the same sentence, the Court 
noted that the Pickering decision had been influenced by the lack 
of any adverse effect on the working relationship between the 
parties. Together, these passages suggest that the most important 
factor in the Pickering analysis is whether the teacher's conduct ad­
versely affects her working relationship with the objects of her crit­
icism,115 but the language also suggests that the Court will tolerate 
substantial interference by a public employee before first amend­
ment expression is outweighed by the state's interests. This is 
probably due, in part, to the fact that Doyle allows the state to dis­
charge an employee if the state can prove it would have done so 
anyway, regardless of the employee's first amendment expres­
sion. 116 The Court's emphasis on the effect of speech on the work­
ing relationship between the employee and the objects of her criti­
cism clarifies Pickering by assigning a relative weight to each of the 
numerous factors cited in that decision. In addition, the Court's 
decision had the beneficial effect of expanding teachers' first 
amendment right to express themselves while providing the state 
with a means for discharging disruptive employees under the Doyle 
test. It is significant that the Court continued to emphasize har­
mony, discipline, and institutional efficiency as compelling state in­
terests in the Pickering test, yet the overall weight of these factors 
has been diminished due to the Court's willingness in Givhan to 
tolerate potentially substantial interferences with the working rela­
tionship.117 
working relationship between the teacher and the objects of her criticism. See notes 
30-34 supra and accompanying text. 
113. But we do not feel confident that the Court of Appeals' decision 
would have been placed on that ground [Le. interference in the working re­
lationship between Leach and Givhan sufficient to justify nonprotection 
of Givhan's speech] notwithstanding its view that the First Amendment 
does not require the same sort of Pickering balancing for the private expres­
sion.... 
439 U.S. at 415. 
114. [d. 
115. Id. at n.4. Included under the rubric "working relationship" are considera­
tions of discipline, harmony, personal loyalty, and confidence which are necessary to 
the proper functioning of those relationships. 
116. See notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text. 
117. See Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512,517 (5th Cir. 1974), which held 
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Some exceptionally important language was relegated to foot­
note four. 118 There, Justice Rehnquist explained that private com­
munications are subject to a greater number of state restrictions 
than public speech. When a public employee expresses herself 
publicly, the content of the speech must be assessed to determine 
whether it interferes with either the proper performance of her du­
ties or the normal operation of the school where she is em­
ployed. 119 Private expression, on the other hand, is under a 
greater degree of restraint, being subject to both content assess­
ment and time, place, and manner restrictions. 120 
A significantly different level of protection is afforded public 
and private speech. For public speech, Pickering focuses judicial 
inquiry on the speech's effect on the working relationship and insti­
tutional efficiency to determine whether the speech warrants con­
stitutional protection. 121 In Givhan, the Court indicated that in ad­
dition to content assessment, the time, place, and manner in which 
speech takes place are additional factors to weigh in the Pickering 
balance when private speech is at issue. These additional restric­
tions affect a court's determination of whether particular speech is 
protected by the first amendment, and they may preclude an em­
ployee from obtaining consideration of reinstatement under Doyle. 
Justice Rehnquist established time, place, and manner restric­
tions on private speech because private speech frequently will have 
a greater impact than public speech on the working relationship 
between employees and employers. Public communications are less 
likely to contain the acerbic tone that often is present in personal, 
private confrontations; therefore, they are subject only to content 
assessment. Courts are more likely to find speech protected when 
only its content, rather than the time, place, and manner of its de­
livery, is appraised. Consideration of the environment in which 
speech takes place underscores the importance the Court places on 
working relationships and institutional efficiency although the 
that the employee's speech must substantially and materially affect the discharge of 
duties. 
llS. 439 U.S. at 415 n.4 (citing Pickering v. Board orE-duc., 391 U.S. at 564). 
119. [d. 
120. Private expression, however, may in some situations bring additional fac­
tors into the Pickering calculus. "When a government employee personally confronts 
his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be 
threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but also by the man­
ner, time, and place in which it is delivered." [d. 
121. See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text. 
306 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:289 
Court seems willing to allow a substantial interference in these 
areas to protect the first amendment rights of public employees. 122 
Following his discussion of Pickering, Justice Rehnquist turned 
to Perry and Doyle and reiterated that the public nature of the 
speech protected in these cases was not determinative of their out­
come. 123 The captive audience rationale, asserted by the circuit 
court as a justification for holding Mrs. Givhan's speech unpro­
tected, was then destroyed in one sentence: "[h]aving opened his 
office door to petitioner, the principal was hardly in a position to 
argue that he was the 'unwilling recipient' of her views. "124 The 
Court then articulated the rule of the case, that a public employee 
has a first amendment right to express her views to her employer 
privately. 125 
Finally, the Court addressed Doyle's impact on the facts in 
Givhan. Because Doyle had not been decided at the time Mrs. 
Givhan intervened in Ayers, the district court had not been able to 
apply the more refined Doyle standard. 126 Consequently, the cir­
cuit court was unable to find that Mrs. Givhan would have been 
rehired but for her criticism. 127 The decision of the circuit court, 
therefore, was vacated and remanded to determine whether the 
state would have made the same decision regardless of Mrs. 
Givhan's criticism. Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed 
with the circuit court that the state had failed to meet the Doyle 
standard but nevertheless recommended remanding the case to 
the district court to allow it to determine whether the state's Doyle 
burden was met. 
V. POST-GIVHAN 
In Givhan, the Supreme Court expressly held private commu­
nications subject to constitutional protection. Subsequent cases 
illustrate that this principle has not been limited solely to teachers 
or public employees. Private communications have been protected 
in labor relation disputes,128 and the principle also has been ex­
122. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. 
123. 439 U.S. at 415. 
124. Id. (emphasis in original). 
125. Id. at 415-16. 
126. Id. at 417. 
127. Id. 
128. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 313 (1979). 
"[T]he Constitution guarantees workers the right individually or collectively to voice 
their views to their employer." Id. 
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tended to protect ordinary citizens' telephone conversations. 129 
Courts also have held that involuntary transfers, not simply dis­
missals, resulting from a public employee's speech, sufficiently chill 
first amendment freedoms to warrant application of Pickering, 
Doyle, and Givhan. 130 
Cases construing Givhan have not, however, limited its princi­
ple solely to private communication. In Janusaitis v. Middlebury 
Volunteer Fire Department131 and Barbre v. Garland Independent 
School District, 132 the time, place, and manner restrictions im­
posed upon private speech in Givhan 133 were held applicable to 
both public and private criticism of an employer. 134 This expanded 
reading of the Givhan opinion's footnote four language135 works to 
the detriment of public employees' first amendment rights. By ap­
plying time, place, and manner restrictions to public speech, these 
courts have added factors to the Pickering test which should not be 
considered136 in balancing an employee's right to make public 
statements against the state's interests. In some circumstances con­
sideration of the time, place, and manner of public speech will tip 
the scale improperly against the employee. Once the employee's 
public speech is ruled unprotected, Doyle is inapplicable, and the 
employee is powerless to obtain reinstatement on the basis of a 
first amendment violation. 
Other recent cases illustrate that the Doyle test, approved in 
Givhan, is the appropriate standard for proving causation in situa­
129. Yoggerst v. Stewart, 623 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1980); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 
F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cen. granted, 48 U.S.L.w. 3750 (1980) (first amendment 
provides citizens with a constitutionally protected right of free private discussion). 
130. McGill V. Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 778-80 (7th Cir. 1979). 
131. 607 F.2d 17,25 (2d Cir. 1979). Janusaitis was a volunteer fireman with the 
defendant fire department who publicly and privately criticized the policies and 
practices of the department. Among other things, Janusaitis threatened to report the 
department to the Internal Revenue Service for failing to keep accurate accounting 
methods, frequently criticized the executives in the department, and contributed to a 
newspaper account, which detailed his complaints. 
132. 474 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Barbre, an untenured teacher's aide, 
claimed that she was discharged from her position for asserting at a public school 
board meeting that her salary was below that required by Texas law. In addition to 
her complaints at the public school board meeting, she also contacted members of 
the Texas Legislature to determine the validity of the school board's implementation 
of the applicable statute. 
133. 439 U.S. at 415 n.4. 
134. Janusaitis V. Middlebury Vol. Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d at 26; Barbre v. Gar­
land Independent School Dist., 474 F. Supp. at 698-99. 
135. See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra. 
136. See notes 119 & 120 supra and accompanying text. 
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tions involving improperly motivated dismissals. In Fisher v. 
Flynn,137 a sex discrimination case, the court held that a plaintiff 
must prove the "but for" causation, established by Givhan and 
Doyle, before he or she may recover. Similarly, the First Circuit 
employed the Doyle standard in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. 
NLRB138 to determine whether improper motives led to employee 
discharges. Both of thes'e cases illustrate the utility of the Doyle 
test and the ease with which it can be applied to diverse fact situa­
tions. There is no reason to doubt that the Doyle test will continue 
to aid courts in. all cases involving questions of wrongfully moti­
vated dismissals, whether they concern age, sex, race, or any other 
form of discrimination. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Bessie Givhan was discharged from her teaching position for 
privately expressing to the principal her dissatisfaction with school 
policies and practices perceived by her to be racially discrimina­
tory. The United States Supreme Court held that the first amend­
ment protects the private communications of a public employee in 
commenting upon matters of public concern. This holding repre­
sents a radical shift from the earlier view that public employment 
was a privilege that could legitimately be conditioned upon the re­
linquishment of constitutional rights. It also represented the culmi­
nation of a line of cases which sought to balance the conflicting fun­
damental interests of the employee as citizen and the state as 
employer. 
Pickering v. Board of Education 139 was the first and most fun­
damental step in the process of securing for public employees the 
same first amendment rights guaranteed to all other citizens. The 
test developed in Pickering balanced the teacher's first amendment 
right to comment upon matters of public concern against the state's 
interest in promoting the efficiency of its services. Unfortunately, 
the Court left some confusion regarding the proper weight to be 
accorded the various state interests, and later cases served to clar­
ifY and refine the Pickering test. 
PeITY v. Sindermann 140 reaffirmed the Court's insistence on 
strong support for public employees' first amendment rights. By its 
137. 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979). 
138. 599 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979). 
139. 391 U.S. at 563. 
140. 408 U.S. at 593. 
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allocation of the burden of proof between the parties, Perry also 
established the groundwork for the test later devised in Mt, 
Healthy City School District Board of Education v, Doyle. 141 
The Doyle test remedied one of the major problems resulting 
from Pickering. Prior to Doyle a state could not fire an employee 
who had engaged in first amendment activity even if the state had 
a legitimate reason for firing that employee. Doyle established a 
test requiring the employee first to prove that his speech is pro­
tected under the Pickering standard. Under this test, once the em­
ployee proves that his speech is protected, the burden then shifts 
to the state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
employee would have been fired regardless of his speech. 
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District142 repre­
sents the culmination of Pickering, Perry, and Doyle. Givhan es­
tablished Doyle as the standard for cases involving employee dis­
missals which were motivated by first amendment expression. 
Givhan also added several factors to the Pickering balancing test. 
Most importantly, language in footnote four of the Givhan opinion 
states that private communications are protected by the first 
amendment, but that the private communications of a public em­
ployee are subject to both content assessment and time, place, and 
manner restrictions. Furthermore, the Court has indicated a gen­
eral Willingness to allow a substantial interference in the working 
relationship between a public employee and his or her employer 
before the employee's speech will be held unprotected. The time, 
place, and manner restrictions on private speech, however, indi­
cate that it is easier to find a sufficiently detrimental impact on the 
working relationship when an employee communicates privately to 
his or her employer than when an employee publicly expresses his 
or her ideas. 
Subsequent cases illustrate that Givhan has been adopted and 
read broadly by numerous courts, resulting in expansion of all citi­
zens' first amendment rights. Several courts, however, have taken 
an overly broad view of the time, place, and manner restrictions 
placed on private speech by applying them to public speech as 
well. This improper reading of the Givhan Court's footnote four 
language unnecessarily limits public employees' first amendment 
freedoms. Nevertheless, Givhan clarified the weight to be ac­
141. 429 U.S. at 274. 
142. 439 U.S. at 410. 
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corded the factors set forth in Pickering and established Doyle as 
the test for cases in which employees assert that their dismissal or 
transfer was .unconstitutionally motivated. Givhan also established 
constitutional protection for private communications in general, 
creating rights which previously did not exist. 
John A. Koltes, III 
